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In this paper we study the impact of active participation – or deliberately seeking out other agents
with an aim to convince them – on the dynamics of consensus formation. For this purpose, we
propose an adaptive network model in which two processes shape opinion dynamics at interwoven
time-scales: (i) agents adapt their opinions subject to influence from social network neighbours
who hold opinions within a tolerance interval δ and (ii) agents rewire network connections with
an aim to maximize their own influence on overall system opinion. We study this system in both
an endogenous setting in which all agents are subject to influence and also attempt to maximize
influence, and in a setting of exogenous control, in which external agents not subject to influence
adaptively attempt to maximize their influence. In both settings we find three regimes of stationary
opinion configurations: (i) for low δ a regime of two evenly balanced radicalized opinion clusters
at the extremes of the opinion space, (ii) for intermediate δ a ’winner-takes-most’ regime of two
unevenly sized radicalized opinion clusters, and (iii) for large δ a regime in which very low spread
compromise consensus states can be reached. Comparing to adaptive processes of random and
deliberately spread-reducing rewiring, we demonstrate that in regime (iii) competitive influence
maximization can achieve near-minimal opinion spread within near-optimal times. Further, we also
show that competitive influence maximizing rewiring can reduce the impact of small influential
minorities on consensus states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Insights about the dynamics of opinion formation are
relevant for our understanding of a number of social and
economic processes, ranging from studies of radicaliza-
tion [1, 2], political campaigns [3, 4], the spread of tech-
nology [5] or the development of industries [6] to applica-
tions in financial markets [7] and they might ultimately
shed light on how democracies arrive at political deci-
sions. The field has seen a rich interdisciplinary litera-
ture in econo-physics and computer science, cf. [8, 9] for
reviews. A slightly different take on models of opinion
formation is to study the role of agents who actively at-
tempt to influence the population, e.g., with the intent
to influence decisions to align with particular goals. The
latter setting clearly has relevant applications in adver-
tising and viral marketing [10], but might also shed light
on questions about the spread of fake news or foreign
influence in political elections.
Mostly focusing on issues of optimal allocations of in-
fluence to nodes on a social network influence maximiza-
tion has found much attention, with most work concen-
trating on variants of the independent cascade or thresh-
old type models [11] and elegant computational optimiza-
tion techniques [12], including considerations of compet-
itive settings [13–15].
However, in variants of the very influential indepen-
dent cascade model agents are typically committed to
an opinion once an opinion has been adopted and such
models thus fail to capture the rich dynamics of flipping
back and forth in settings in which there is little cost
to opinion change. Better suited for this scenario are
dynamic models that describe the evolution of opinion
updates based on stochastic rules that allow agents to
change their opinions back and forth. At a basic level
one can distinguish two types of modeling approaches:
models that treat opinions as discrete and models that
deal with a continuous, very often one-dimensional, opin-
ion space. Prominent approaches in the first category
are the voter dynamics [16, 17] and extensions to the
multi-state voter model [18] or Ising-like dynamics [19]
and the related Sznajd model [20]. In a similar vein,
also related models of cultural dynamics like the Axel-
rod model [21] or studies of media influence based on
it [22] have considered discrete opinion spaces. Related
to our study is also the work of [23] in which the role
of hierarchical organizations and authority on consensus
dynamics has been studied. Models of continuous opin-
ion spaces are mostly derived from the DeGroot model
[24] or, including considerations of bounded confidence,
from the models of Weissbuch and Deffuant [25, 26] and
similar kinetic exchange models [27, 28]. Variants of the
model of Weissbuch and Deffuant have proved very influ-
ential in the literature and have recently also been used
to study algorithmic biases in the context of opinion for-
mation [29] or opinion dymamics on interacting networks
of competing media and social networks [30].
External influence has mostly been modelled by intro-
ducing so-called ‘zealots’ [31] that represent agents with
a bias [31, 32] or even unidirectional influence [33] that
can lead to consensus states in which multiple opinions
can coexist. Zealotry in various forms has been exten-
sively studied with some recent extensions to the noisy
voter model [34] or some models that also include the
effects of mass media in models derived from the multi-
state voter model [35, 36]. However, studies of zealotry
typically do not focus on the questions of optimal allo-
2cation or competition in the placement of zealots in the
social system.
Recent literature has started to address questions of
optimal allocation for the dynamic models of opinion
formation, with studies focusing on the voter dynamics
[37–41], Ising-like models [42], and variants of AB mod-
els [43]. While some studies point to a nuanced picture
of optimal allocations depending on noise and details of
the goal-functions of the optimizing parties [40, 44], a
common thread is that optimal allocations are often well
approximated by targeting hub nodes [37, 39].
However, whilst optimal allocation for dynamic mod-
els has found some recent attention, up to our best
knowledge adversarial settings in which competing agents
strive for maximal influence for dynamic models have not
yet been studied. Here, we investigate the impact of com-
petitive influence maximization on opinion dynamics in a
continuous model which we introduce as a variant of the
Weissbuch-Deffuant model [25] and related Hegselmann
and Krause model [45]. Different from most studies of
influence maximization which focus on details of alloca-
tion rules for static networks, we formulate our models as
an adaptive network model [46], in which opinion change
and competitive influence-maximizing rewiring interact
at similar time scales. We thus essentially explore the ef-
fects of agents’ active participation in opinion dynamics
via deliberately seeking out suitable other agents with
an aim to convince them of their own opinions. The
literature provides several models of adaptive opinion
dynamics and network change for the case of network
rewiring inspired by agents seeking homophily [47–49]
which typically results in a phase transition between a
multi-cluster state and a consensus state. However, up
to our best knowledge ideas of competitive influence max-
imizing rewiring have not been studied in the context of
adaptive network models so far.
Below, instead of focusing on details of optimal al-
location which is the main aim of studies on influence
maximization [11, 12, 37–40, 44], our main interest is in
the impact of influence-maximizing rewiring on the over-
all opinion dynamics. We thus investigate the question
how active participation of agents in opinion competi-
tion impacts on consensus states and equilibration time
scales. As we will see below, depending on parameters
of the consensus dynamics, active influence-maximizing
rewiring can either lead to radicalization and a split of so-
cieties into extreme opinion clusters at the boundaries of
the opinion space or be in a regime in which more aligned
compromises can be reached in near-optimal time.
Often in opinion dynamics in populations with peer
influence small but well-connected minorities can have a
dominating influence on consensus states [50]. Interest-
ingly, we also find that competitive influence maximiza-
tion strongly reduces the impact of such minorities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Sec. II we outline our modelling choices and define
metrics that quantify the opinion dynamics. Section III
then presents our main findings and with a summary and
discussion in section IV we conclude the paper.
II. MODEL
We consider a population of N agents, each of which
holds an opinion x ∈ [−1, 1] described by a continuous
variable with initial opinions being drawn uniformly at
random from [−1, 1]. Agents are connected by a binary
directed social network given by its adjacency matrix aij ,
with aij = 1 if i links to j and aij = 0 otherwise. A
connection from agent j to agent i models that j can
influence i. Through peer influence and external factors
opinions of agents are subject to change via
xi(t+1) = xi(t) +α
∑
j
aijHδ(xj(t)− xi(t)) +∆ηi, (1)
where Hδ(x−y) = x−y if | x−y |≤ δ and Hδ(x−y) = 0
otherwise. In Eq. (1) above, α ∈ (0, 1) models the rate
of opinion change, δ gives a tolerance parameter, such
that only agents whose opinions differ by less than δ
will be taken into account when updating, and ∆ gives
the strength of external effects modelled by uncorrelated
white noise η. According to (1) agents will adjust their
opinions depending on the average effect of neighbours
with opinions not farther away than δ and will also be
affected by external factors whose weight we model by
the strength of noise ∆. By introducing a tolerance pa-
rameter δ the above model of opinion dynamics takes
inspiration from the model of Weissbuch-Deffuant [25] or
related kinetic exchange models [27, 28], but, similar to
the DeGroot model [24], treats the dynamics of opinion
change as synchronous updates accounting for simulta-
neous influences of all neighbours instead of subsequent
pairwise interactions as in [25].
In the following, we will consider a simultaneous dy-
namics of opinion change and network change in which in-
dividual agents competitively attempt to rewire connec-
tions to enhance their influence on the overall consensus
state. For this purpose, we will assume that each agent
can change who she/he influences (i.e. adjust her/his
out-connections), but note that we do not allow for self-
connections. The influence of an agent on the system
can be measured by the closeness of the average opinion
X = 1/N
∑
j xj to the agents opinion, i.e. the influence
of agent i is given by
Ii = |xi −X | , (2)
where i may be considered as having maximum influence
if Ii = 0, i.e. the system completely agrees with i and
minimum influence Ii ≈ 2 if all other agents maximally
disagree from i.
In more detail, we consider the following adaptive dy-
namics [46] of opinion change and network evolution: (i)
opinions evolve for one time step according to Eq. (1).
Boundary conditions for the opinion space are strictly
enforced, such that opinions will always be restricted to
3the interval [−1, 1]. Note, that we have also experimented
with asynchronous updating in which, instead of simulta-
neously updating the opinions of all agents, only a num-
ber of randomly selected agents update their state ac-
cording to Eq. (1). The main effect of such asynchronous
updating is a change of time scales of opinion formation
relative to network change. Beyond rescaling of time,
a change to asynchronous updating does not result in
qualitative differences to the results we present below for
synchronous updating. (ii) Subsequently, m agents are
chosen at random. Each of them considers rewiring an
out-link x → y to x → z, where z is selected at random
from all nodes with z 6= x and azx = 0. Specifically, agent
x will rewire, if her/his influence Ix(Γ) > Ix(Γ
′) is im-
proved in the rewired network configuration Γ′ compared
to her/his influence in the original network configuration
Γ. To estimate her/his influence in both configurations,
agent i will estimate opinions in the next time step based
on Eq. (1) ignoring unpredictable external effects (i.e.
setting ∆ = 0). If the rewiring is accepted, we proceed
with the rewired configuration Γ′, otherwise the network
is restored to its original state Γ. (iii) The iteration of
steps (i) and (ii) is then repeated until a quasi-stationary
state has been reached.
Note that both the parameters m and α essentially
define the time scale of network change relative to the
consensus dynamics, which is slow for small m (or large
α) and increases in relative speed when m increases (or α
decreases). For numerical reasons we will fix the value of
α (using a reasonably slow time scale of opinion dynamics
with α = 10−4 such that network adaptation can have an
effect before a consensus is reached) and mainly explore
the dependence of outcomes on changes of m below.
The above dynamics essentially describes a compet-
itive process in which agents subsequently attempt to
change the system trying to align it with their own opin-
ions. As agents typically hold different opinions, their
goals are typically not aligned. Note, that such a scenario
could also be formalized as a network creation game with
N actors and one could attempt to find game-theoretic
equilibria of this game. The resulting strategy space in
such a game would be of enormous size and strict compu-
tation of equilibria would require extremely large compu-
tational resources on the part of the actors. Here instead,
we assume boundedly rational agents with limited com-
putational power, and consider the above defined best-
response-like dynamics, similar to [51, 52].
Below, we are mostly interested in consensus forma-
tion in the population of agents. In the proposed model
consensus is well characterized by the spread of opinions
and hence we define an order parameter
r2 = 1/N
∑
i
(xi − 〈x〉)
2 (3)
such that r = 0 corresponds to a perfect consensus. An
important measure is also the time scale of equilibration
towards consensus. Following [51, 53, 54], we measure
this scale by defining a normalized order parameter
˜r(t) =
r(t)− r∞
r0 − r∞
(4)
and then measure a relaxation time scale via the sum
τrelax =
∞∑
t′=0
r˜(t′), (5)
which can capture the effect of multiple relaxation times
for a monotonically decaying function.
III. RESULTS
In the following numerical simulations are carried out
to investigate the effects of the adaptive dynamics of
opinion spread and competitive influence maximization
on consensus formation. In principle, we are interested
in two types of settings. In the first, we will consider
an endogenous adaptive dynamics in which a large frac-
tion (or all) of the population of agents simultaneously
attempt to maximize their influence on the system. In
this setting, all agents are considered endogenous, and
they can thus be influenced by others as well as influence
others. We will analyze this setting in subsection III A.
The second setting of interest is the exogenous setting,
in which influencers are extrinsic to the system. In this
case, these external agents can influence (and optimize
their influence on) the system, but they are not them-
selves subject to influence. We will analyze this scenario
in subsection III B.
A. Competitive rewiring: Endogenous dynamics
Figure 1 provides some first numerical results illustrat-
ing the adaptive dynamics of opinion change and network
rewiring for three settings of low (δ = 0.5), intermedi-
ate (δ = 0.75) and high (δ = 1.5) tolerance parameter
δ. For comparison, also results obtained for two differ-
ent adaptive rewiring processes are included. In the first
we consider purely random rewiring, i.e. in step (ii) of
the adaptive dynamics every rewired configuration is ac-
cepted independent of whether it enhances influence or
not. Random rewiring is of interest to evaluate the role of
network change and serves as a baseline for comparison.
As a second process, we have also considered rewiring
in which configurations are accepted if they reduce the
overall spread of opinions r. We label this process ”opti-
mal”, as it represents a rewiring dynamics that aims for
the fastest convergence of opinions to a state with the
lowest possible spread.
Panel (a) of Fig. 1 illustrates the time evolution of
opinion spread r for large δ and compares the three
adaptive rewiring processes. We see that subject to all
three adaptive dynamics an initially diverse distribution
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FIG. 1. Different equilibrium outcomes for the influenced
opinion dynamics for different settings of the tolerance param-
eter δ: (a,c) averaged time dependence of the opinion disper-
sion r for δ = 1.5 and δ = 0.5, (b,d): stationary distributions
of the opinions in equilibrium for δ = 1.5 and δ = 0.5. The fig-
ures compare three different settings for rewiring: competitive
influence maximization (influence), rewiring to reduce r (op-
timal), and random rewiring (random). (e,f): δ = 0.75. (e)
Evolution of the average opinion X for various example runs
and (f) distribution of the final averaged opinion X. Com-
parisons to non-competitive dynamics omitted in (e) and (f).
Results are averaged over 50 independent runs for a system
of N = 1000 nodes, noise ∆ = 0.001, 〈k〉 = 10, and m = 1.
of opinions collapses over time and finally reaches a quasi-
stationary state after an initial transient period. Results
in Fig. 1a show that the adaptive dynamics with random
rewiring is relatively slow and leads to a more spread out
distribution of opinions than optimal and influence maxi-
mizing rewiring, cf. also panel (b) in which the stationary
distributions of opinions are compared. Importantly, we
see that for influence maximizing rewiring the consensus
dynamics proceeds at almost the same time scale as that
of the optimal process, resulting in an only slightly more
spread out distribution than when deliberately minimiz-
ing spread. The figure already highlights a key result
of our study, i.e. that competitive influence maximiza-
tion can speed up consensus formation and can result in
near-optimal stationary consensus states.
However, panels (c) and (d) of Fig. 1 illustrate that
influence maximization does not always accelerate con-
sensus formation. In the figure we see that for small
tolerance parameters competitive influence maximization
can also result in opinion ‘fragmentation’, i.e. states in
which the population is split into two ‘radicalized’ clus-
ters of agents holding opinions close to the boundaries
of the opinion space. Note, that similar clustering is not
observed in the cases of random rewiring or the opti-
mal rewiring process. In both cases, for the given toler-
ance parameter δ = 0.5, a unimodal distribution of opin-
ions centred around the middle of the interval [−1, 1] is
reached (cf. Fig. 1d).
The case of intermediate tolerance δ is illustrated in
panels (e) and (f) of Fig. 1. In panel (a), we show an
ensemble of trajectories for the evolution of the average
opinion X = 1/N
∑
i xi and also plot the corresponding
histogram over final average opinions at the end of the
simulations. We note clusters of X at around X = ±0.8
implying that also for this value of δ opinions become
polarized with a majority of agents either approaching
the left or right boundary of the opinion space, whilst
a minority converges to the respective opposite end of
the opinion space. The situation reflects a ‘winner-takes-
most’ scenario, in which, with equal chance, either radi-
cal end of the opinion space can grow to dominance. The
extent, to which this is the case is quantified in the dis-
tribution of final average opinions X : the larger and the
farther away from each other the peaks of this bimodal
distribution, the stronger the tendency for the winner-
takes-most scenario. We can thus quantify the severity
of the winner-takes-most effect via the standard devia-
tion σ(X) of the distribution of average opinions. We
find that small standard deviations correspond to a nar-
row distribution of outcomes centred around a consensus
in the middle of the interval [−1, 1] and large standard
deviations correspond to the bimodal distribution with
peaks close to ±1. As we will see below, winner-takes-
most scenarios are not encountered for random or optimal
rewiring.
In Figure 2 we systematically explore the dependence
of the adaptive dynamics on the tolerance parameter δ.
We show simulation data for averaged opinion spreads r
(panel a), averaged relaxation times towards the station-
ary state (panel b) and the standard deviation of average
opinions (panel c), and again compare the influence max-
imization to random rewiring and optimal rewiring. The
bottom row of the figure visualizes typical network con-
figurations for very small, small, intermediate, and large
choices of δ.
First, for very small tolerance parameters, we find
configurations marked by the presence of several opin-
ion clusters, cf. also the network visualization in panel
(d). Convergence times in this regime are typically very
long, see Fig. 2b. Second, as δ is increased, configura-
tions reached subject to influence maximization exhibit
marked differences to random or optimal rewired net-
works. In this regime, we typically find opinion polar-
ization and radicalization with two clusters close to the
borders of the opinion space arising, see also panel (e)
for a visualization of such a network. It is worth point-
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FIG. 2. Dependence of outcomes of the adaptive influence dynamics on δ for a scenario of all agents attempting to maximize
their influence on the system: (a) opinion dispersion, (b) relaxation times, (c) standard deviation σ(X) of the average opinion
X at the end of simulations. The figures compare three different settings for rewiring: competitive influence maximization
(influence), rewiring to reduce r (optimal), and random rewiring (random). Results are averaged over 50 independent runs for
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FIG. 3. Dependence of (a,c) the average relative opinion dis-
persion r and (b,d) average relative relaxation times on the
intensity of influence maximization (measured by the number
of attempted optimization steps m per update) for the sce-
nario of a network of all agents attempting to maximize their
influence on the system (top) and a scenario of two external
agents with opinions x = ±1 attempting to maximize their in-
fluence on the system. Results are averaged over 50 indepen-
dent runs for a system of N = 1000 nodes, noise ∆ = 0.001,
〈k〉 = 10. In the scenario of external influencers each controls
kext = 509 nodes.
ing out that such radical polarization is not found in
either random or optimal rewiring and is thus caused by
competitive rewiring.
Further increasing δ the regime of polarization and rad-
icalization ends in a third regime, a fairly small transition
region, in which typically still two radicalized clusters
at opposite ends of the opinion space appear. However,
opinion spreads are lower than in the previous regime,
corresponding to the two clusters having markedly dif-
ferent sizes. In this regime we find the winner-takes-
most effect described above. This transition region is
well demarcated by a corresponding peak in the plot of
the standard deviations of mean opinions in panel Fig. 2c
as well as by a peak in convergence times in Fig. 2b. For
yet larger δ > 1 a fourth regime, in which compromise
consensus states marked by very low opinion spreads r
are reached, is found. In this regime we note the near-
optimal opinion spread r and close-to-optimal conver-
gence times, as discussed above. For a more detailed
discussion of issues of scaling with system size or differ-
ent choices of noise we refer to subsections Ia and Ib of
the supplementary material.
Interestingly, consensus enhancement in the large δ re-
gion is not dependent on the feedback of agents maxi-
mizing the influence of their own (dynamically changing)
opinions. To test the impact of this feedback, we also
considered a model in which agents attempt to maximize
influence defined by
Ii = |gi −X | , (6)
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FIG. 4. Comparison between agents which attempt to max-
imize the influence of their (dynamic) opinions with agents
which optimize the influence with regard to static randomly
drawn goals (static). Dependence of (a) the averaged opin-
ion spread and (b) average relaxation times on the tolerance
parameter δ. Results are averaged over 50 independent runs
for a system of N = 1000 nodes, noise ∆ = 0.001, 〈k〉 = 10,
m = 3.
where gi is a randomly drawn goal state gi ∈ [−1, 1] in-
stead of an agents’ own actual opinion as in Eq. (2).
Figure 4 compares simulations based on the two different
influence definitions following equations (2) and (6). Two
observations stand out. First, in the second scenario, we
note the absence of the polarized radicalized state for low
δ and the absence of the winner-takes-most states. Sec-
ond, for large δ in the second scenario competitive influ-
ence maximization also reaches a slightly worse, but still
near-optimal consensus state with slightly slower tran-
sients compared to the scenario in which agents maximize
the influence of their actual opinions. We can thus con-
clude that the radicalizing polarisation and the winner-
takes-most effect are caused by the feedback of adapting
opinions on influence maximization. In contrast, con-
sensus enhancement and accelerated transients can be
achieved when agents attempt to maximize influence, ir-
respective of the actual goals they pursue.
As we have seen in Fig. 2, depending on the toler-
ance parameter, competitive influence maximization can
either result in radicalization and polarization or it can
facilitate consensus formation and result in a far lower
spread consensus states than random rewiring. The ex-
act spread of the stationary consensus state depends on
the relative time scales of adaptive influence maximiza-
tion and the opinion dynamics. More specifically, the
more agents m are allowed to rewire per time step of the
opinion dynamics, the more important competitive influ-
ence maximization becomes relative to the dynamics of
opinion spread. For large δ we explore this dependency
in more detail in the panels of Fig. 3 where we visualize
results obtained from experiments in which m was varied
between m = 1 rewiring agent per time up to m = 200
rewiring agents per opinion update. As more intense ran-
dom rewiring tends to improve mixing and will thus also
result in narrower consensus states, to factor out the lat-
ter effect, results in Fig. 3 are given relative to random
rewiring with the same number m of rewiring agents per
opinion update. We can clearly see that more intense
influence maximization will result in relatively narrower
consensus states (Fig. 3a) and typically also in shorter
transients and faster dynamics to reach the consensus
state (see Fig. 3b). We have also conducted analogous
experiments for the low δ setting for which we don’t il-
lustrate results. As one would expect, in the this setting
we also find that equilibration to the polarized configu-
rations becomes the faster the larger m.
A next question that arises is how results of the com-
petitive influence maximization process depend on the
number of participating agents. Do consensus states be-
come the more sharply focused the more agents attempt
to impose their opinions? To explore this issue we con-
duct experiments in which we randomly select a propor-
tion ρ of agents as active. Whereas all agents continue to
be subject to opinion changes specified in Eq. (1) only
active agents will attempt to rewire their out-connections
in the influence-maximizing step of the adaptive dynam-
ics, i.e. when choosing an agent for rewiring we restrict
the choice to randomly selecting an active agent.
Results of numerical simulations that explore the de-
pendence of stationary outcomes on ρ and the tolerance
parameter δ are shown in Fig. 5. Panel (a) of Fig. 5
visualizes a heat map of stationary opinion spreads as a
function of ρ and δ and panel (b) gives the correspond-
ing heat map for relaxation times. We note the existence
of the two regimes discussed before: i.e. a regime of two
polarized radical clusters for low δ and a compromise con-
sensus state for large δ, separated by a transition region
in which relaxation times become very large. Two obser-
vations are in order. First, the location of the boundary
between the regimes depends on ρ. The smaller the pro-
portion of influence maximizing agents, the lower the tol-
erance threshold at which polarization sets in (see Fig.
5a). Second, as illustrated by the isolines in the large
compromise consensus regime, a reduction in rewiring
agents does not necessarily impede consensus formation.
Panel (c) of Fig. 5 makes it clear that there exists an op-
timal number of influence maximizers at around ρ = 0.2
which minimizes opinion spread. As we see in panel Fig.
5d, such minimal opinion spread can be reached without
much loss in convergence time, i.e. convergence times
have typically plateaued off in the trelax(ρ)-dependence
before the optimal value of ρ has been reached. We thus
find that the best compromises are reached when only
a certain proportion of agents actively tries to maximize
their influence on the system.
It is of interest to investigate which factors influence
the optimal number of rewiring agents ρopt. For instance,
from the isolines in Fig. 5a which are parallel to the
y-axis we see that ρopt is independent of the tolerance
parameter δ. We have carried out extensive numeri-
cal simulations to explore r(ρ) dependencies for different
settings of noise strength ∆, social network connectivi-
ties, and different intensities of influence maximization
m. Whereas the first parameter has no influence on ρopt,
we find a clear dependence on the connectivity of the so-
cial network and the intensity of influence maximization
m. These dependencies are illustrated in panels (e) and
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FIG. 5. Dependence of (a) the stationary spread r and (b)
the convergence times trelax on the tolerance parameter δ and
the density of influence optimizing agents ρ. For (a) isolines
at r = 0.0696, 0.0697, 0.0700, 0.0705, 0.0710, 0.0715 have been
added to visualize the optimum at ρ ≈ 0.2. (c) and (d) show
the dependence of r and trelax on ρ for δ = 1.5. Panels (e,f)
show the dependence of the optimal proportion of influence-
maximizing agents on (e) the average connectivity of the so-
cial network 〈k〉 and on (f) the intensity of influence maxi-
mization m. Results are averaged over 50 independent runs
for a system of N = 1000 nodes, noise ∆ = 0.001, 〈k〉 = 10,
m = 1.
(f) of Fig. 5. Panel (e) illustrates simulation data for
different connectivities of the social networks. We see
that the more connected the social network, the smaller
the optimal fraction of maximizing agents. That is, op-
timal consensus states on sparse social networks can be
achieved when large proportions of the population at-
tempt to maximize influence, whereas optimal results in
dense networks require only very limited participation in
influence maximization. The relationship between opti-
mal participation ρopt and intensity of influence maxi-
mization is explored in panel (f) of Fig. 5. We note that
the more intense the influence maximization relative to
the dynamics of opinion spread, the larger the optimal
participation ratio.
A last point of interest in this section is to investigate
the role of influential minorities on consensus formation
in the presence of competitive influence maximization.
For this purpose, we consider two types of numerical ex-
periments. In the first, we introduce an influential mi-
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FIG. 6. Dependence of mean consensus X on the presence of
influential minorities. (a) Dependence of X on the out-degree
of minority agents kextr in a setting where normal agents have
out-degree kout = 10. Minority agents are defined as agents
with initial opinions xi(0) > 0.95. (b) Dependence of mean
consensus X on a threshold xextr in a setting in which normal
agents have kout = 10 and agents with initial opinion xi(0) >
xextr are assigned out-degree kout = 100. (c) Evolution of the
spread of the mean X for all agents and mean Xextr for the
minority group and spread of consensus state r over time. (d)
Evolution of the in-degree kin of minority agents over time.
Results are averaged over 20 independent runs for a system
of N = 1000 nodes, noise ∆ = 0, 〈k〉 = 10. To emphasize the
effects of influence maximizing rewiring, the time constant for
opinion convergence is chosen one order of magnitude smaller
than in the rest of the paper (α = 10−5) and we use a large
value of m = 100. Panels (c) and (d) are for xextr = 0.95 and
kextr = 100.
nority by allocating larger out-degrees of kout > 10 to
agents with initial opinions xi(0) > 0.95, whereas all
other agents are allocated out-degrees of kout = 10. We
thus set up an influential minority of agents with extreme
opinions which comprises only 2.5% of the agent popu-
lation. We then vary kextr in the interval [10, 1000], al-
lowing the minority to control between 2.5% and roughly
72% of all links. It is thus expected that influential agents
with kout > 10 would have a larger influence on consensus
states than normal agents with kout = 10 and we expect
average consensus states to be significantly shifted into
the positive domain.
Simulation results for this first type of experiment
are visualized in Fig. 6a where we compare the depen-
dence of average consensus states for influence maximiz-
ing rewiring and random rewiring. Note that, in order to
rule out random drift of the extreme minority, we have
not included noise in opinion updates for these experi-
ments. In Fig. 6a we observe that in both cases X > 0
and we observe a monotonic increase inX with increasing
influence kextr of minority agents, as expected. However,
it stands out that consensus states are significantly less
8strongly impacted by the minority opinion in the pres-
ence of influence maximizing rewiring.
In a second type of setting, we have allocated minority
agents larger out-degrees kout = 100, but defined minor-
ity agents as agents with initial opinions xi(0) > xextr
and then varied xextr, allowing to tune the fraction of
minority agents in the population. As initial opinions
are drawn at random from [−1, 1] we have varied xextr
between xextr = 0 and xextr = 1, changing their share in
the overall population from close to 0% to 50%. Numer-
ical results for this setting are given in Fig. 6b, where
we again compare to adaptive random rewiring. We note
again that the presence of an extreme minority sways
consensus states, but the influence of the minority is at-
tenuated when adaptive influence maximizing rewiring is
present.
To understand the mitigating influence of competitive
influence maximization we have tracked the evolution of
average opinions of the population and of the minority
and the in-degrees of the influential minority agents in
Figures 6c,d. Figure 6d makes it clear that before getting
close to reaching a consensus state within the population
minority agents attract substantially above average in-
degrees. More detailed observation shows a wave like
pattern in which the minority initially attracts large in-
degrees, but loses and gains in-links as it holds or loses
the position of representing the most extreme opinions
in the population. These results highlight two feedback
mechanism inherent in the process of competitive influ-
ence maximization. First, within the tolerance range δ,
agents with opinions at the extremes of the distribution
of opinions in the population attract more in-links and
thus tend to be drawn faster toward the consensus state.
This mechanism is the crucial feedback allowing popula-
tions to reach sharper consensus states with competitive
influence maximizing rewiring. Second, since by influenc-
ing influential agents other agents can enhance their re-
spective influence, also agents which are more influential
than average tend to attract larger than average numbers
of in-links. Influential extreme minorities are subject to
both aspects of this feedback mechanism and their opin-
ions tend to be quickly drawn towards the average of the
population, such that the number of neighbours they can
convert to extreme views remains limited.
B. Competitive rewiring: The exogenous setting
In this section we consider scenarios only involving ex-
ternal influencers. Note, that in contrast to Sec. III A
the external controllers are not subject to influence from
other agents.
We start the analysis by considering two external in-
fluencers which hold opinions x = −1 and x = 1 at the
borders of the opinion space. Network parameters are
adjusted such that 〈k〉 = 9 and the external influencers
both have out-degree kext = 509, such that the effective
connectivity 〈k〉 = 10 is the same as in the endogenous
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FIG. 7. Different equilibrium outcomes for the influenced
opinion dynamics for different settings of the tolerance pa-
rameter δ for the scenario of two external controllers with
opinions ±1: averaged time dependence of the opinion dis-
persion r for (a) δ = 1.5 and (c) δ = 0.6 and stationary
distributions of the opinions in equilibrium for (b) δ = 1.5
and (d) δ = 0.6. The figures compare three different settings
for rewiring: competitive influence maximization (influence),
rewiring to reduce r (optimal), and random rewiring (ran-
dom). Results are averaged over 50 independent runs for a
system of N = 1000 nodes, noise ∆ = 0.001, 〈k〉 = 10, m = 1.
setting.
Figure 7 compares the competitive rewiring dynamics
for this setting to a scenario in which the external influ-
encers either rewire randomly or with an aim of minimiz-
ing opinion spread. Similar to what we have seen for the
case of endogenous competitive influence maximization,
we again note that for large tolerance δ competitive influ-
ence maximizing rewiring of the now external controllers
can lead to a near-optimal consensus state which can
be reached in near-optimal time, cf. panels 7a and 7b.
In contrast, for low tolerance, a three-cluster state with
one compromise-cluster centred around x = 0 and two
clusters aligned with the opposite controllers at x = ±1
(cf. panel (d) of Fig. 7), is found. Hence, interest-
ingly, even though the two controllers hold extreme oppo-
site opinions, their respective attempts to gain influence
can actually promote a compromise consensus within the
population, given that the tolerance parameter δ is large
enough. To understand this effect, consider the case of
δ = 2 and a population of agents in the absence of a so-
cial network. Since, according to the opinion dynamics
in Eq. (1), ∆xi(t) ∝ xj(t) − xi(t), a controller j can
then maximize its influence by targeting nodes i which
maximize | xj(t)− xi(t) |. The controller with x = 1 will
thus target agents as close to x = −1 as possible, and
the controller with x = −1 will target agents as close
to x = 1 as possible. In both cases radical agents from
the opposite end of the spectrum are targeted and their
opinions are drawn closer toward the centre of the opin-
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FIG. 8. Dependence of outcomes of the adaptive influence dynamics on δ for a scenario of two external controllers with opinions
±1 attempting to maximize their influence on the system: (a) opinion dispersion, (b) relaxation times, (c) standard deviation
σ(X) of the average opinion X. The figures compare three different settings for rewiring: competitive influence maximization
(influence), rewiring to reduce r (optimal), and random rewiring (random). Results are averaged over 50 independent runs for
a system of N = 998 nodes noise ∆ = 0.001, 〈k〉 = 9. The external controllers have out-degrees kext = 509, so that the overall
network has average degree 〈k〉 = 10 and we use m = 1. The bottom row shows example network configurations for a network
composed of 50 nodes with 〈k〉 = 4 and external influencers controlling 10 nodes each. External controllers are indicated as
black or white agents at the boundaries of each network visualization. Nodes directly controlled by the two external controllers
are aligned along vertical lines next to the controllers, whereas nodes that are not directly controlled are positioned along an
ellipse in the centre of each network visualization. The figures are for settings of δ = 0.1 or δ = 0.3 (first and 2nd from left,
two opinion clusters), δ = 1.2 (middle, one opinion has won) and δ = 2.0 (right, consensus has been reached as a compromise).
ion space. Thus, as a result of the competitive influence
maximization of the two external controllers, the most
radical agents are selected in turn and moved closer to
the centre, thus resulting in improved consensus states.
In contrast, for small δ when the ranges of the two ex-
ternal controllers don’t overlap, agents at the borders of
their respective ranges will be targeted, resulting in two
radicalized clusters at the boundaries of the opinion space
while agents in the centre remain uninfluenced, thus ex-
plaining the presence of the three cluster states noted in
numerical results above.
We proceed with a numerical investigation of the case
in which agents are connected by social networks. Fig-
ure 8 shows the results of a systematic exploration of
the dependence of outcomes of the adaptive dynamics on
the tolerance parameter δ together with visualizations of
typical network configurations. We note the following
possible outcomes. For small δ the three-cluster state
discussed above is found. As δ is increased, the opin-
ion clusters at the boundaries of the opinion space grow,
whereas the compromise cluster centred around x = 0
shrinks. This regime corresponds to the rise in r ap-
proaching a maximum at around r ≈ 0.85 (cf. Fig. 8a).
For the range 0.7 ≤ δ ≤ 1.1 we then find a regime in
which one of the extreme clusters at | x |= 1 grows to
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FIG. 9. Dependence of the relative opinion spread
rinfluenc/rrandom and relative relaxation times tinfluence/trandom
on the distance of the location of the external influencers from
x = 0. Locations at x = 0 correspond to two external influ-
encers holding identical opinions at 0, whereas location x = 1
corresponds to the two external influencers holding opinions
±1. Results are averaged over 50 independent runs for a sys-
tem of N = 1000 nodes, δ = 1.5, noise ∆ = 0.001, 〈k〉 = 10.
dominance and coexists with a smaller cluster at the op-
posite end of the opinion space. This corresponds to a
very flat maximum in σ(X) seen in Fig. 8c. It is note-
worthy that the extent of this regime is far larger than
for the endogenous setting (cf. Fig. 2). Moreover, dis-
crepancies in size of the two radicalized clusters in the
endogenous setting tend to be far larger than in the en-
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dogenous setting, i.e. the larger cluster wins out almost
completely such that a near consensus close to a radical-
ized state at one of the boundaries of the opinion space
is reached. In contrast to the endogenous setting, also
random rewiring and optimal adaptive rewiring support
such a ‘winner-takes-most’ regime. Beyond δ = 1.1 com-
petitive rewiring results in a single compromise cluster
around x = 0 which can be reached in near-optimal tran-
sients.
As also observed in the endogenous regime, the spread
of consensus states and time scales at which stationarity
can be reached depend on the intensity m of the compet-
itive rewiring process relative to opinion spread. Results
illustrated in the bottom panels of Fig. 3 show that in
the large tolerance regime the spread of consensus states
decreases with the intensity of rewiring and also time
scales decrease slightly with increasing m.
So far in this section we have analyzed the role of two
external controllers located at the extreme boundaries of
the opinion space. In the following, we parameterize the
relative location of the external controllers by their dis-
tance d from the centre of the opinion space at x = 0
and explore the dependence of consensus states and time
scales on d. Settings of d = 0 thus correspond to the two
controllers both attempting to align the system with an
opinion of x = 0 (i.e. both controllers pursue the same
goal for this case), whereas a choice of d = 1 reproduces
the scenario of two controllers at x = ±1 investigated
before. Intermediate values of 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 interpolate
between both extremes. As also the reference case of
random rewiring is influenced by the location of the con-
trollers, we give results relative to random rewiring in
the following. Numerical results for the relative station-
ary opinion spread and relative time scales to stationar-
ity are visualized in the panels of Fig. 9. We note that
whereas relative time scales show only a slight tendency
to decrease with d, consensus states become relatively
sharper the farther apart the controllers are from each
other. Thus, provided the distance of the controllers is
small enough to remain within the high tolerance regime,
consensus is facilitated the farther apart the external con-
trollers.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated an adaptive network
model of opinion formation that combines a dynamics
of opinion change with competitive network rewiring of
agents attempting to increase their respective influence
on the rest of the population. The model is based on
incremental adaptations of opinion states subject to net-
work neighbours whose opinions differ less than a given
bounded tolerance level δ and external effects modelled
as white noise of strength ∆. We have investigated the
model in two settings, in which either all agents attempt
to rewire and are subject to influence (the endogenous
setting) or only external controllers not subject to influ-
ence from the system adaptively adjust their control (the
exogenous setting).
We generally find that in both, endogenous and ex-
ogenous settings of competitive influence maximization,
stationary outcomes of opinion polarization marked by
the presence of extreme opinions at the boundaries of
the opinion space and regimes of compromise, in which
all agents adopt opinions close to an opinion represen-
tative of the initial average of the population, exist. In
more detail, we have demonstrated the presence of three
regimes. First, for low tolerance δ, stationary outcomes
are characterized by the presence of radicalized clusters
at the extreme ends of the opinion space. Second, for in-
termediate tolerances, we find ‘winner-takes-most’ states,
in which one extreme opinion has grown to dominance,
but coexists with the other extreme opinion in various
proportions. Last, in a third outcome typical for large
tolerances, agents end up in compromise states sharply
focused around the centre of the opinion space. These re-
sults differ markedly from outcomes of homophily-driven
adaptive rewiring in opinion dynamics, which exhibit dif-
ferent types of typically multi-cluster regimes and for
which adaptive rewiring tends to render global consen-
sus more difficult to achieve [48].
As one of our main results we have argued that in
the third regime competitive influence maximization can
suppress differences of opinions and result in very nar-
row distributions of stationary opinions which are close
to results that could be achieved by rewiring deliberately
aimed at generating consensus states. Moreover, in the
third regime, these states of near-optimally low opinion
spread can also be reached within near optimally short
transient times. Consensus states become the sharper
and convergence time scales the shorter the more intense
the competitive influence maximization process is rela-
tive to the process of opinion change.
Interestingly, best consensus states are not achieved
when all agents in the population attempt to maximize
their influence. Instead, we show that there exists an
optimal number of participating agents which will mini-
mize opinion spread. We find that this number depends
on both the intensity of the rewiring process and on
the connectivity of the social network. Optimal spreads
are achieved with smaller numbers of rewiring agents
in dense social networks and rewire numbers of par-
ticipating agents that are the larger the more intense
the rewiring process relative to the dynamics of opinion
change.
As a last important result, we have also shown that
in the large tolerance regime competitive influence max-
imizing rewiring suppresses the influence of small influ-
ential minorities with extreme opinions. We have argued
that under competitive influence maximization already
more influential agents tend to attract large numbers of
in-links. As a result such agents tend to be drawn back
to average opinions and thus their impact on consensus
states is reduced.
We think that our work also opens up a number of
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interesting direction for future work. First, we have lim-
ited our investigation to exploring processes of adaptive
influence maximization separately in endogenous and ex-
ogenous settings. It will be of interest to also explore
results in scenarios in which both processes are present
at the same time and investigate the role of time scales at
which internal and external agents rewire on the consen-
sus dynamics. Second, our investigation in the present
paper has been restricted to one specific model of con-
sensus formation. Previous literature has investigated
many variants of such models and some results may de-
pend on details in the model formulation (c.f. [8, 9] for
reviews). For instance, we have treated opinions as con-
tinuous, thus allowing agents to gradually shift positions
in response to influence. A large part of the literature has
treated opinions as binary or discrete. Future work will
also investigate such competitive influence maximization
processes in discrete models of opinion formation.
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